This article focuses on confidentiality in international arbitration and whether
it is directly addressed in confidentiality clauses or simply assumed by the
parties of a given dispute as an implied, general standard of arbitration.
Among Danish lawyers at least, it is generally understood that confidentiality
automatically attaches to arbitral proceedings and associated documents, as
confidential preparations, proceedings and awards are part of the main reason
that many businesses agree with a business partner to arbitrate future disputes
rather than litigate in an ordinary court.
Our aim is to investigate and communicate the status and limits of confidentiality
in international arbitration – its status as an implied term and as an
agreed or statutory clause.
In Denmark there is a general assumption that the preparations, proceedings
and awards of arbitration cases are confidential. The legal committee established
by the Danish Law Society to submit a proposal for a new arbitration act has
mentioned that one of the advantages in arbitration is the discretion vested
with the parties to the conflict; the confidential proceedings and preparations;
and the fact that the award will only become known if enforcement becomes necessary
by means of the ordinary courts or if an annulment of the arbitral award is
sought by means of the court.2 With regard to the actual proceedings, this assumption
appears correct but it falters when it comes to the preparations and the award.
The Danish Act on Arbitration is silent on these matters. The only reference
made in this context to statutory law is to the Act on Civil Procedure, where
it follows from section 28a that: “All proceedings in court will be public,
unless otherwise decided by law. Court proceedings in which a judgment is rendered
must always be public”. This reference is often used as an argument for
why arbitral proceedings are confidential, but there is no similar rule concerning
confidentiality or publicity in the Act on Arbitration.
Furthermore, there is no Danish case law to illustrate the position in this
field and very limited literature available to shed light on the matter. One
of the more recent books written on Danish and Nordic arbitration mentions3
that one of the reasons for choosing arbitration is that the parties can agree
on confidentiality. This implies that only when agreed can parties rely on confidentiality
as the norm. In the same context the book states4 that proceedings are confidential,
but there is no explanation or reference given as to where the requirement of
agreed confidentiality or the implied confidentiality of the proceedings originate.
It is also assumed in Denmark – supported, among others, by reference
to the IBA’s Rules of Ethics for International Arbitration, section 9
– that arbitration judges have an inherent non-disclosure obligation about
all matters related to the arbitration case with which they are dealing.5 This
is again unsupported by any other source than rules and standards in other countries.
Finally, reference is made to a Swedish Supreme Court case (described below)
when stating6 that the other areas of the confidentiality question (confidentiality
of the written preparations and of the award) are issues of uncertainty in Danish
law. It is believed to be beyond doubt that the passing of information about
the preparatory process or the award is allowed if a party has a loyal interest
in doing so. Addressing the validity of an arbitration court or its award will
also allow publicity with regard to the documents. After the Swedish ruling,
a Danish court might very well reach the same conclusion as the Swedish Supreme
Court: that there is no implied duty of confidentiality for the parties to an
arbitration case, and confidentiality will only come about when specifically
agreed to by such parties.
In Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd (Bulbank) v AI Trade Finance Inc,7 the Swedish
Supreme Court did not recognise an implied duty of confidentiality. Bulbank
attempted to nullify an award for AI Trade because it had disclosed a favourable
jurisdictional ruling in the arbitration to Mealey’s International Arbitration
Report, where details of the ruling were published:8
AI Trade went further, also giving the arbitral chairman a copy of the article,
who in turn, gave it to a former judicial colleague on the Swedish Supreme Court,
who quoted the article in one of his judgments!9
The court was clear that a judgment in favour of Bulbank would only be possible
if AI Trade had been bound to a duty of secrecy by Swedish law, the institutional
arbitration rules that the arbitration was conducted under, or contract. Since
no such obligations existed in any of the three sources of law, Bulbank was
obliged to pay the award to AI Trade.10
The question is whether this assumption that confidentiality is not an implied
obligation to the parties in an arbitration case has general support. Below,
the case law of other countries will be examined and arbitration rules of international
institutions will also be scrutinised for any clauses in this respect.
Several well-known English cases recognise an implied duty of confidentiality
in arbitral proceedings,11 but this duty is perhaps best articulated in Ali
Shipping Corp v Shipyard Trogir.12 Here the English Court of Appeal held that
an implied duty of confidentiality barred an arbitration party from using documents
and other materials gathered in a previous arbitration in a subsequent one to
establish an estoppel defence.13 The court explained:
in holding as a matter of principle that the obligation of confidentiality (whatever
its precise limits) arises as an essential corollary of the privacy of arbitration
proceedings, the court is propounding a term which arises ‘as the nature
of the contract itself implicitly requires.’14
In its effort to find appropriate boundaries of this implied obligation of
confidentiality, the court thought it better to formulate “exceptions
of broad application to be applied in individual cases” rather than adapting
the general rule of implied confidentiality “in light of the particular
circumstance and presumed intentions of the parties at the time of their original
agreement.”15 Using precedent as a guide, the court articulated five exceptions:
(i) consent of the arbitrating parties; (ii) order of the court; (iii) leave
of the court; (iv) disclosure reasonably necessary for the establishment or
protection of an arbitrating party’s legal rights with regards to a third
party; or (v) ‘the interests of justice.’16 The court specifically
adopted the phrase ‘the interest of justice’ over ‘public
interest’ so as not to appear to be accepting the Esso Australia Resources
v Plowman17 case as the law of England. In Esso Australia, the public interests
of the people of Victoria trumped any confidentiality claims made by a commercial
gas supplier and two Victorian public utilities concerning information disclosed
in arbitrations between the gas supplier and utilities.18 In addressing the
Esso Australia decision, the Ali Shipping court stated:
In the [Esso Australia] case, only the dissenting judgment of Toohey J appears
to me to treat the law of privacy and confidentiality in relation to arbitration
proceedings on lines similar to English law. While it may well fall to the English
court at a future time to consider some further exception to the general rule
of confidentiality based on wider considerations of public interest, it is not
necessary to do so in this case.19
In Associated Eclectic & Gas Insurance Services (AEGIS) v European Reinsurance
Company of Zurich (Zurich),20 the Privy Council found that even though a confidentiality
provision in AEGIS and Zurich’s arbitration agreement forbade disclosure,
AEGIS could nevertheless use the arbitral award against Zurich to establish
an estoppel defence in a subsequent arbitration with Zurich. Their Lordships
stated that such use was not the “mischief at which the [confidentiality]
clause” was directed, and to prohibit any disclosure of the award would
frustrate a fundamental purpose of the arbitration by preventing enforcement
of the award.21
Their Lordships distinguished AEGIS v Zurich from Ali Shipping, in that the
case before them involved construing the scope of an express confidentiality
agreement, whereas in Ali Shipping none existed. Thus, any generalisations and
the formulation of detailed implied terms were not appropriate to the present
facts.22 Another distinction made was that in the case before the Privy Council,
the same parties were involved in both arbitrations, whereas in Ali Shipping
they were different.23
Their Lordships then expressed reservations about the desirability or merit
of adopting an implied duty of confidentiality as it risks failing to distinguish
between different types of confidentiality that attach to different types of
documents or to documents that have been obtained in different ways and elides
privacy and confidentiality. Their Lordships then explained why materials generated
in an arbitration should be distinguished from the award in assessing confidentiality.
Their Lordships noted that restrictions on the use of material obtained in arbitral
proceedings may have greater impact than those in litigation because commercial
arbitrations, unlike litigation, do not place anything in the public domain.
Their Lordships, however, found that the same logic could not be applied concerning
the award. Unlike documents, the award may have to be referred to for accounting
purposes or for the purpose of legal proceedings or for the purposes of enforcing
the rights that the award confers.24
In reaction to AEGIS v Zurich, one commentator suggested that the decision appears
to suggest that confidentiality should be evaluated on its own terms as opposed
to artificial privacy considerations that support an implied obligation of confidentiality.25
Further, the “strong inference now being the House of Lords, when it next
considers an appropriate case, may take a new approach in defining the existence
of a duty of confidentially,” even possibly adopting an approach consistent
with Australia, Sweden and the United States, where no implied obligation is
recognised.26
France also recognises an implied duty of confidentiality. In Aïter v Ojjeh,27 the Cour d’appel of Paris dismissed a party’s action to annul an arbitral award rendered in London and “imposed substantial civil damages on [that party] for having caused ‘a public debate of facts which should remain confidential,’ thus violating ‘the very nature of arbitral proceedings that they ensure the highest degree of discretion on the resolution of private disputes, as the two parties had agreed.’”28 This opinion has been heavily criticised, even with what the Cour d’appel called a “clearly incompetent jurisdiction”.29 The opinion is disliked because the court failed to give any reasoning to support why the nature of arbitration intrinsically requires the highest degree of confidentiality and provided no exceptions to the implied duty as England had.30 Given this extreme position, it is possible that a French court will adopt a more nuanced stance on confidentiality in a subsequent hearing.31
In Esso Australia, the High Court of Australia provided an exhaustive analysis
on the issue of implied duty of confidentiality with regards to commercial arbitrations
and held that no such duty exists. The court made an important distinction in
that “while it is one thing to say that an arbitration hearing is private
in the sense that strangers are excluded, it is another thing to say that it
is confidential.”32 The court was especially concerned that before Dolling-Baker,
a 1991 English decision on which Ali Shipping relies, there was no English case
law suggesting that an arbitration hearing was confidential as distinct from
private. Therefore, “if such an obligation had formed part of the law,
one would have expected it to have been recognised and enforced by judicial
decision long before Dolling-Baker.”33 The court further stated that if,
arguendo, a duty of confidentiality existed, it would nevertheless be trumped
by the public interest to the governmental information involved as the arbitration
parties included public utilities.34
The court then provided guidance as to how parties could obtain confidentiality:
An obligation not to disclose may arise from an express contractual provision.
If the parties wished to secure the confidentiality of the materials prepared
for or used in the arbitration and of the transcripts and notes of evidence
given, they could insert a provision to that effect in their arbitration agreement.
Importantly, such a provision would bind the parties and the arbitrator, but
not others. Witnesses, for example, would be under no obligation of confidentiality.35
Although the US has not adopted an implied duty of confidentiality, it has
not explicitly rejected it either. It can be inferred, however, from two court
opinions concerning confidentiality in arbitration, United States v Panhandle
Eastern Corp36 and Industrotech Constructors, v Duke University,37 that it is
unlikely that a US court would observe such a duty.
In Panhandle Eastern, the US government sought documents related to an arbitral
proceeding between Panhandle Eastern (PE) and Sonatrach for an upcoming trial.
PE attempted to prevent the disclosure of documents with two arguments. First,
it cited several confidentiality rules contained in appendix II of the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, the institution that conducted the
arbitration. The court quickly dismissed this argument, as the rule cited by
PE applied only to the members of the Court of Arbitration.38
PE also attempted to invoke rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which prevents or limits a discovery request for good cause; that is, the movant
must demonstrate a particular need for protection. In its attempt, PE argued
that PE and Sonatrach had a “general understanding” that the pleadings
and related documents in the arbitration would be kept confidential,”
and if this general understanding was breached, it would severely prejudice
future business negotiations as to price, quantities and term of deliveries
under a new contract between PE affiliates and a Sonatrach subsidiary. The court
held that such broad allegations of economic injury, without more specific evidence,
are insufficient to show good cause under rule 26(c).39
In Industrotech Constructors, the underlying dispute arose between Duke University
and a building contractor. The appellant, Duke, was contesting a discovery order
to provide transcripts of an arbitration between Duke and another building contractor.
The court found that although Duke insisted that the arbitration stipulated
that the proceedings would remain confidential, absent a written stipulation
in the record (as the case was here), Duke’s argument must fail.40
Duke also argued that even absent evidence of a stipulation of confidentiality,
public policy requires arbitration confidentiality. Absent such policy, arbitration
parties will become circumspect and overly litigious and thus chill the informal
process of arbitration. The court, insisting on finding a confidentiality rule,
stated that Duke cites no case law for this proposition and nothing in the North
Carolina statutes governing arbitration require strict confidentiality. Thus,
neither the law nor the contract to arbitrate barred disclosure.41
Article 33(2) of the CIETAC Rules is quite expansive: “[T]he parties,
their representatives, witnesses, [and] interpreters [...] shall not disclose
to any outsiders any substantive or procedural matters of the case.”42
Although this provision may initially seem attractive because of its simplicity
and scope, we find it troublesome. First, no arbitration hearing is an island.
If in complying with a subpoena, a party disclosed a “substantive or procedural
matter of the case,” that party would be in violation of article 33. A
party would also violate article 33 if it revealed such information in asserting
a legal right or defending itself in a dispute independent of the arbitration.
Second, the confidentiality rule is mandatory and therefore does not allow parties
to contract a tailor-made rule as other institutional rules allow. Although
there is some flexibility by allowing parties to request an open hearing, this
results, however, in an all-or-nothing approach: either arbitrations are completely
secret or open.
Obviously, its weakness is also its strength, with the expansive language that
parties “shall not disclose to any outsiders any substantive or procedural
matters of the case,” it seems that little or nothing could be told to
“outsiders.” If parties place a high value on secrecy, drafting
a confidentiality provision mirroring article 33(2) maybe a proper choice as
this rule is one of the strongest confidentially provisions among institutional
arbitration rules.
However, it is unclear what remedies are available if a party discloses confidential
information. Would an offender have to be taken to the arbitration board or
a court of law? What would be the damage? Most institutional arbitration rules
are also silent on how to remedy a breach of confidentiality.
The Swiss Rules are based on the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Arbitration.43 The Swiss Rules,
however, contain a confidentiality provision, article 43, whereas the UNCITRAL
Model Law provides none. Article 43 is restrained and nuanced in comparison
to CIETAC Rules, article 33(2). Article 43(1) is a default provision in which
the “parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential all
awards and orders as well as all materials submitted by another party in the
framework of the arbitral proceedings not otherwise in the public domain.”
It further provides three exceptions: (i) where a disclosure may be required
of a party by a legal duty; (ii) to protect or pursue a legal right; or (iii)
to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceedings before a judicial authority.
As such, article 43(1) parallels English case law in that both recognise a ‘general
principle’ of confidentiality, which is subject to similar exceptions.44
Although parties can contract around article 43(1), article 43(3), concerning
the award, is mandatory. It tackles the issue of award confidentiality, however,
with “impeccable accuracy and style”.45 It allows an award to be
published, partially or in its entirety, under three conditions: (i) a request
for publication is addressed to the Chambers; (ii) all references to the parties’
names are deleted; and (iii) no party objects to such publication within the
time limit fixed for that purpose by the Chambers.
The ICC Rules of Arbitration have no specific provision compelling the parties
to maintain confidence of their arbitration.46 “Therefore confidentially
will depend on the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, the rules of law
governing the arbitration, the law of the place of arbitration and the measures
taken by the tribunal under article 20(7)”.47 Whether or not confidentiality
exists under applicable law or in an arbitration agreement, the broad, sweeping
language of article 20(7) allows the tribunal to “take measures for protecting
trade secrets and confidential information.”48 “The logical inference
here is that issues concerning confidentially, in the context of arbitral proceedings,
should be made by the parties with the relevant vested interest.”49 For
example, if a party needs to introduce a trade secret as evidence in an arbitration
with a competitor, the tribunal may forbid the use of the trade secret information
outside the context of the arbitration.50
Such reasoning, however, is conjectural, especially in the light of the flexible,
yet ambiguously drafted rule. To be overly cautious, the ICC rules guarantee
confidentially of the arbitral proceedings “only inasmuch as they secure
the privacy of the arbitration” through article 21(3).51 Article 21(3)
excludes outside parties from the arbitration, which in some jurisdictions provides
an implied duty of confidentiality for information related to the arbitration.52
In reality, however, the rule is drafted so the tribunal can handle complex
and varied confidentiality concerns of the parties. But it would be foolhardy
to expect the tribunal to always side with confidentiality.
Concerning the award, article 28(2) does not allow outsiders of the arbitration
access to an award from the ICC, but it does not, however, prevent the parties
themselves from sharing an award with others.
A key advantage of choosing the ICC Rules of Arbitration is the ability to draft
a controlling confidential agreement, even if such a provision is missing in
the underlying arbitration agreement. Although not specifically stated in the
Rules, parties “may find it opportune to include a clause on confidentiality
in the Terms of Reference to protect their rights and the documents submitted
by them during the course of the proceedings.”53
The WIPO rules are unique in their comprehensive and compartmentalised treatment
of confidentiality.54 The rules separately address confidentiality concerning
information that is confidential in itself, such as trade secrets (article 52),
the existence of arbitration (article 73), disclosures made during the arbitration
(article 74), and the award (article 75). The rules “also specify on whom
the obligation to maintain confidentiality is imposed – namely, the parties
(articles 73-75), [and] witnesses (article 74(b)).”55 Remedies for breach,
though, are absent from the WIPO rules.
“Article 52 deals with the protection in arbitration of information that
is confidential before it is disclosed.”56 Article 52(a) defines confidential
information as information in the possession of a party, not accessible to the
public, of commercial, financial, or industrial significance, and treated as
confidential by the party possessing it.57 Article 52(b) requires a party to
apply to the tribunal in order to have the information classified as confidential
and to provide a copy of the application to the other party. In the application,
the applying party should only provide reasons why the information should be
confidential and not the information itself. Article 52(c) requires the tribunal
to first determine if the information is confidential, and if so, if its disclosure,
in the “absence of special measures of protection in the proceedings”,
would be likely to cause serious harm to the party invoking its confidentiality.
If the tribunal makes such a determination, it will decide under which conditions,
the extent, and to whom the information be disclosed.
Article 73 prevents parties from unilaterally disclosing the existence of an
arbitration to any third party except for three exceptions. The first and second
exceptions are if disclosure is necessary in connection with a court challenge
to the arbitration or an action for enforcement of an award. Even in such situations,
the party must disclose no more than what is legally required and inform the
tribunal and other party that it has done so or only the other party if the
arbitration has terminated before the disclosure. The third exception allows
parties to disclose to a third party “only the names of the parties to
the arbitration and the relief requested in order to satisfy any obligation
of good faith or candour owed to that third party.”
Although article 73 is quite protective, it may be unreasonable to allow a party
involved in an arbitration to inform third parties of the existence of the arbitration
only when it is obliged to do so.58 A party may need to demonstrate to third
parties its preparedness to take appropriate action to protect its interests
so to prevent further arbitration, litigation or other conflicts.59 It seems
more appropriate to mirror article 52; that is, article 73 should bar disclosure
of the existence of arbitration when it would likely cause seriously harm to
an involved party.
Article 74 is titled ‘Confidentiality of Disclosure Made During the Arbitration’.
It supplements article 52 (which applies to information that is confidential
before the proceeding) in treating any document or other evidence given by a
party or a witness during the arbitration as confidential and barred from use
or disclosure to a third party. Unlike article 33(2) of the CIETAC Rules, article
74(a) restricts the scope of confidential information to information not in
the public domain and would not have otherwise been accessible to a party, but
for that party’s participation in the arbitration. Article 74(a) also
allows use or disclosure to a third party of such information with the consent
of the parties or order of a court having jurisdiction.
Article 74(b) specifies that a witness called by a party is not a third party
for purposes of article 74(a). But, if a witness is giving evidence or other
information obtained in the arbitration by the calling party, such party shall
be “responsible for the maintenance by the witness of the same degree
of confidentially as that required of the party.”
Article 75 allows the award to be disclosed to a third party by the parties
under three independent situations: (i) the parties consent; (ii) the award
is in the public domain as a result of an action before a national court or
other competent authority; or (iii) the award must be disclosed in order to
comply with a legal requirement or to establish a legal right against a third
party.
In contrast to WIPO’s approach of trying to draft a rule for each aspect
of confidentiality, the following rule proposed by Jeffery Sarles would leave
the scope of confidentiality decision to the parties at the onset of arbitration:
In all arbitrations, the arbitrators shall require at the threshold that the
parties agree on the scope of confidentiality, failing which the arbitrators
shall enter a protective order on the scope of confidentiality. The parties
shall by rule be deemed to have agreed to the terms of that order. Any claim
asserting a violation of the parties’ confidentiality agreement or protective
order accruing during the course of the proceeding shall be resolved by the
arbitrators. Any violation of the parties’ confidentiality agreement or
protective order accruing after the proceeding is terminated shall be resolved
by arbitration according to the terms set forth in the parties’ arbitration
agreement. Arbitrators may impose appropriate damages and penalties on parties
found to have breached the confidentiality agreement or protective order.60
This rule has several possible advantages over the previously discussed rules.
Although it is debatable whether it is an advantage or not, parties can set
the scope of confidentiality at the beginning of arbitration, rather than at
the time of contracting.61 Thus, parties are likely to be more informed of the
context of which information may be shared. However, at this stage it might
be difficult for the parties to agree on anything and if the parties cannot
agree, then a fallback provision is presented by giving the authority to an
arbitrator to set the scope. Most importantly, remedies are addressed. “[T]he
provision for penalties in the event of a breach of the confidentiality agreement
would serve to deter breaches where damages from a breach may be nonexistent
or minimal.”62
Although this rule was proposed to be a universal arbitration default rule,63
until such a thing exists, parties can easily include a similar term in their
arbitration agreement.
* * *
Based on the above – the case law as well as the rules dealing with the
confidentiality issue – it must be concluded that the preferable situation
is to agree in writing on confidentiality in some form when the arbitration
agreement is made.
It can be a general and all-embracing confidentiality clause that comes into
force if the parties are unable to agree more specifically on the scope of confidentiality
concerning the arbitration preparations and award. Or, if such an agreement
proves to be impossible to reach, a plain confidentiality clause obliging the
parties to keep matters concerning the preparations, the proceedings and the
award confidential before, during and after the arbitration case is more satisfactory
than leaving the decision to arbitral panel or court of law. One exception to
such a confidentiality agreement will necessarily have to be enforcement by
ordinary courts, which should be mentioned.
In all circumstances, no advisor can predict which party will have the greater
interest in confidentiality if a conflict arises; thus, it appears wise to include
a confidentiality clause in all arbitration agreements that clients sign.
1 We would like to thank our research assistant Sam Bergstrom,
a third-year law student at the University of Texas, for his invaluable assistance.
2 Law Society’s Legal Committee in Reform of the Arbitration
Act, p35, 2003.
3 By Jacob Juul and Peter Faurholdt Thommesen, p15 in Voldgift,
GadJura, 2003.
4 Ibid, p16.
5 Ibid, p208, with references to Norwegian and Swedish theory
on this matter.
6 Ibid, p209-10.
7 Case No. T 1881-99, 27 October 2000 (Swedish Sup Ct).
8 J W Sarles, ‘Solving the Arbitral Confidentiality Conundrum
in International Arbitration,’ 18 ADR & the Law, American Arbitration
Association 2 (2002).
9 Steven Kouris, ‘Confidentiality: Is International Arbitration
Losing One of its Major Benefits?’, 22 J INT’L ARB L 127, at 135.
10 C Romander & L Pettersson, Confidentiality in Swedish
Arbitration Proceedings.
11 Dolling-Baker v Merrett, 2 All ER 890 (Eng CA 1991); Hassneh
Insuracne Co of Isreal v Mew, 2 Lloyds Rep 243 (QB 1993).
12 1 Lloyd’s Rep 643, 2 All ER 136 (Eng CA 1998).
13 Ibid at 899; Kouris, supra note 9, 129 (2005).
14 Ali Shipping Corp, 2 All ER at 147.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid at 147-48, 149.
17 Esso Australia Resouces Ltd v Plowman, 183 CLR 10, 128 ALR
391 (1995).
18 Ibid at 402-403.
19 Ali Shipping Corp, 2 All ER at 149.
20 [2003] UK PC 11 (29 January 2003).
21 Ibid at 11.
22 Ibid at 20.
23 Ibid. (Although this may be technically true, I find it
a misleading statement. Shipyard Trogir was in a subsequent arbitration with
a subsidiary of a parent company that also owned Ali Shipping. Ali Shipping
brought an injunction to prevent disclosure and, as detailed supra, won.)
24 Ibid.
25 Kouris, supra note 9, at 131-32.
26 Ibid at 132.
27 Cour d’appel, Paris, 18 February 1986, 1986 REV ARB
583.
28 Ibid.
29 W Laurence Craig et al, International Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration 316 (3d ed 2000).
30 Kouris, supra note 9, at 136.
31 Ibid.
32 Esso Australia, 128 ALR at 398.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid at 402-403.
35 Ibid at 400.
36 118 FRD 346 (D Del 1988).
37 314 SE 2d 272 (NC App 1984).
38 Panhandle Eastern Corp, 118 FRD at 347-350.
39 Ibid at 350.
40 Industrotech Constructors, Inc, 314 SE 2d at 274.
41 Ibid.
42 CIETAC Arbitration Rules (effective 1 May 2005), www.cietac.org.cn/english/rules/rules.htm
(last visited 11 September 2007).
43 Swiss Rules (effective 2004), www.swissarbitration.ch/rules.php
(last visited 11 September 2007). (Note that the UNICITRAL Model Law is not
a convention but rather a model for other countries and institutions to follow
in order to promote harmonisation).
44 Kouris, supra note 9, at 137.
45 Matti S Kurkela & Hannes Snellman, Due Process in International
Commercial Arbitration, p190 (2005).
46 Kouris, supra note 9, at 137.
47 Michael W Bühler and Thomas H Webster, Handbook of
ICC Arbitration, section 20-71 (2005).
48 ICC, Rules of Arbitration (effective 1 January 1998), www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp
(last visited 11 September 2007).
49 Kouris, supra note 3, at 137.
50 Yves Derains and Eric A Schwartz, A Guide to the New ICC
Rules of Arbitration 264 (1998).
51 Bühler and Webster, supra section 20-71.
52 Ibid at section 21-47.
53 Bühler and Webster, supra section 18-61.
54 Hans Smit et al, WIPO Arbitration Rules: Commentary and
Analysis 235 (2000).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid at 178.
57 WIPO, Arbitration Rules (effective 1 October 2002), www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/
(last visited 11 September 2007).
58 Smit, supra note 50, at 244.
59 Ibid.
60 Sarles, supra note 33, at 8.
61 Kouris, supra note 9, at 138 (“The consistent message
conveyed through the judicial decisions and by leading commentators is that
the parties themselves should expressly provide for confidentiality (preferably
in the arbitral agreement and not when the disputes arises), as a from of self-regulation”).
62 Ibid at 8-9.
63 Ibid at 8.
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